Abstract: Information leakage can lead to loss of intellectual property and competitive edge. One of the primary sources of information leakage in collaborative design is sharing confidential information with collaborators, who may be also collaborating with competitors. Hiding information from collaborators is challenging in co-design because it can lead to inferior and sub-optimal solutions. Therefore, there is a need for techniques that enable designers to protect confidential information from their collaborators while achieving solutions that are as good as those obtained when full information is shared. To address this need, we propose a secure co-design (SCD) framework that enables designers to achieve optimal solutions without sharing confidential information. It is built on two principles: adding/multiplying a parameter with a large random number hides the value of the parameter, and adding/multiplying a large number is orders of magnitude faster than using existing cryptographic techniques. Building on the protocols for basic arithmetic computations, developed in our earlier work, we establish protocols for higher-order computations involved in design problems. The framework is demonstrated using three co-design scenarios: requirements-driven co-design, objective-driven co-design, and Nash non-cooperation. We show that the proposed SCD framework enables designers to achieve optimal solutions in all three scenarios. The proposed framework is orders of magnitude faster than competing (but impractical for engineering design) cryptographic methods such as homomorphic encryption, without compromising on precision in computations. Hence, the proposed SCD framework is a practical approach for maintaining confidentiality of information during co-design.
INTRODUCTION

Secure Collaboration in Engineering Design
Collaborative product development involves stakeholders from various fields such as product design, simulation, validation, manufacturing, and service at different stages of the product lifecycle. Over the years, the nature of collaboration in product development has evolved from consulting to turn-key, and from contract manufacturing to co-design. As the complexity and multidisciplinary nature of the products increase, information exchange often crosses corporate and national boundaries. The design of Boeing 777 airplane, for example, involved more than 10,000 external people [1] . Similarly, Ford Motor Company works with more than 1,000 suppliers across the globe [2] .
Information exchange plays a vital role in effective collaborative product development. Product data and lifecycle management platforms have enabled efficient ways to send/receive large amounts of information (e.g., CAD/CAM data), and also perform computations (e.g., Finite Element Analysis) by designers located across the globe. Such platforms enable designers to share product information including geometry, functional properties, design constraints, and performance characteristics with their collaborators. However, in many cases sharing information even with collaborators is undesirable, and protecting the confidentiality of design information is important. Consider the following scenarios:
1. In a competitive world, today's collaborator can be tomorrow's competitor (e.g., Samsung became a competitor to Apple in the smartphone business). 2. For marketing and corporate-strategy reasons, some features of the final product are not revealed (e.g., Apple does not reveal screen size of its new iPhone). 3. Laws and regulations may prohibit full exchange of information. There may be anti-trust laws if the participants are intra-national, or national-security related prohibitions may apply when collaborating with foreign entities. 4 . Information can leak to a competitor through a common collaborator [3] . For example, Solectron provided man-ufacturing services for IBM and Hewlett-Packard. Additionally, perfect copies of the information (e.g., CAD data) can be made easily. With the emergence of 3D printing technologies, it is becoming easier to convert design information into physical products. Therefore, while sharing information in collaborative design, there is a risk of loss of intellectual property and competitive edge.
Confidentiality and Optimality in Co-design
Designers can conduct their collaborations in two distinct ways. First, designers can openly share information with their collaborators. For the reasons stated in Section 1.1, this approach is prone to information leakage even though it might help in developing good solutions. This approach is referred to as cooperative design [4] within the engineering design literature. In the second approach, referred to as a noncooperative design scenario, designers can choose to hide confidential design information [4] such as desired performance characteristics, specifications or internal constraints. While hiding information achieves confidentiality, it may result in a sub-optimal design because the parties would not be able to gain a complete understanding of the design problem. At times, it may even mislead the collaborators.
Techniques such as access control [5, 6, 7] and inference control [8, 9, 10] are only designed to prevent access from un-authorized users, not from misuse by collaborators (see details in Section 2). Collaborative design protocols such as passing rational reaction sets [11] , and passing ranged sets of specifications [12] are also limited because the other party may be able to infer confidential information from the rational reactions.
The tradeoff between confidentiality of information and the optimality of design motivates the research question in this paper: How can confidentiality of design information be preserved while simultaneously achieving optimal solutions in a co-design setting? Here, "co-design" refers to both cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios, and "optimality" refers to the best solutions that can be obtained by complete information sharing (as in cooperative design).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we discuss the current approaches for addressing security issues in design, and their limitations in addressing the research question. Section 3 provides details of the building blocks of the SCD framework. In Section 4, we introduce the proposed SCD framework. In Section 5, we illustrate the application of SCD for different design scenarios. The advantages and limitations of our approach are discussed in Section 6. Finally, closing comments are presented in Section 7.
SECURITY IN COLLABORATIVE DE-SIGN: STATE OF THE ART
Collaborators require the channels through which they share information to have the following properties:
1. Authentication: Information shared should be accessible only by the authorized designers.
2. Protection against misuse: Authorized designers should use the shared information only for mutually agreed purposes [13] . 3. Non-repudiation: The proof of the origin of a particular data should be provided. 4 . Integrity: Information sharing should be immune to external attackers.
Computation efficiency:
The time taken to perform a computation should be reasonable.
Simultaneously achieving all these properties ensures that the information transferred among collaborators is secure. Different approaches are currently being used for ensuring information security in product development. These approaches can be classified into following broad categories:
(1) Access Control, (2) Tamper-resistant and Obfuscated software, (3) Trusted-Third Party Server (TTPs), (4) Inference Control, (5) Contract Agreements and (6) Task Partitioning, and (7) Encryption. In the following, we discuss these approaches and their limitations in maintaining information security in co-design.
Access Control
The security models in co-design platforms such as product data management (PDM) and product lifecycle management (PLM) systems are focused on access control through authentication and authorization. Authentication is the process of checking the identity of the users, i.e., ensuring that the user is, in fact, who he/she claims to be. Authorization is the process of determining who can access what. Role-based access control models have been used [5, 6, 7] , where users can be authorized to access information based on their groups or roles within an organization (see Figure 1) . Zhang et al. [14] combined access control techniques with data security techniques and proposed a three layered security model for collaborative product development.
The primary limitation of the role-based security models in current co-design frameworks is that an individual either has access to data/models or not. Distributed collaborative simulation platforms such as iSIGHT, ModelCenter, and FIPER also lack the capabilities to protect confidential information encapsulated in computational models, while enabling combined system-level simulations. The access control approach does not allow any computation on confidential data without revealing it. If an individual needs to use a part/feature for certain operation, he/she must be granted (complete) access to the information associated with it.
Tamper-Resistant and Obfuscated Software
A software is tamper-resistant if it breaks and ceases to function properly when a user attempts to modify it (i.e., only the software publisher can do so). Such software is often obfuscated, in the sense that it is deliberately made difficult to comprehend (hence difficult to modify). It is well known that any software's tamper-resistance and obfuscation techniques can eventually be broken by a determined attacker. If "eventually" is long enough, the perishable nature of information may make the break inconsequential (i.e., by the time the attacker learns the other participants' confidential inputs, they − 2 − Manuscript Submitted to: ASME Journal of Computing and Information Science in Engineering would not be of much value). But is "eventually" likely to be long enough, in this specific use of such software? Unfortunately not, because in this specific case the attacker has a much easier task than the full defeat of the tamper-resistance and obfuscation: All it takes is running the software in a virtual machine while making a transcript of its execution, then using that transcript off-line to trace the execution and figure out the other participants' inputs (by identifying where in its execution the software has just finished decrypting these inputs).
Trusted Third-Party Server (TTPs)
The TTP approach consists of using a server trusted by all the participants, e.g., from one of the main cloud service providers. Such a server would receive from the participants their respective confidential inputs, which it would use to carry out the computations and reveal to the participants only what they are supposed to learn (the intended output). The main risk of this approach is probably not that the cloud service provider would, as an organization, decide to betray the participants by revealing or secretly using their confidential inputs (although possible, it is rather unlikely). The greater risk is that the confidential information is learned by rogue employees of the cloud service provider (e.g., the people who maintain and update its servers), or that the information is compromised through a break-in by hackers, or through a malware or spyware infestation, or even in a completely non-malicious (i.e., accidental) manner.
Inference Control
Information sharing between designers can have unintended effects. For example, a designer can use reverse engineering models to learn about manufacturer's interests or product characteristics. Such actions can lead to leakage of confidential information. Techniques such as suppression, generalization [8, 15] have been proposed to mitigate the risks of such inferences based on shared information. These methods work well if the confidential information is known before sharing. Researchers from supply-chain management have studied information leakages from inferences. Zhang et al. [9] proposed a conceptual model that helps a manufacturer to measure the risk of information leakage. Pibernatik et al. [16] introduced the notion of stochastic security when reverse engineering models exist. Stochastic security uses a stochastic benefit sharing rule which randomly selects the solution from a distribution of feasible solutions. This random selection prevents the designers to infer about other designer's confidential parameters.
Task Partitioning
In task partitioning, a design task is divided into a set of sub-tasks and these sub-tasks are distributed among different designers. Researchers in the filed of design chain management have studied the issues related to the partitioning of a design task and integration of sub-tasks in a collaborative setting. Choi et al. [17] proposed a design chain collaborative framework to help designers integrate design chains in a collaborative setting. This framework allows design managers to integrate design chains at different stages in the product development process. Liu and Zeng [18] developed a comprehensive design chain model using the environment-based design theory. This model identified conflicts arising due to data access in a product lifecycle management process and suggested using secure information sharing techniques. Sun et al. [19] demonstrated this approach in a supply chain as a strategy to prevent the leakage of confidential information. A supplier is assigned to the design parameters of a sub-system that cannot leak any confidential information about the system. Such an approach is harder to implement in a design stage as the interdependence among sub-systems is high and the relationships among sub-system parameters are evolving during design iterations.
Contract Agreement
There can be incompatibility among designers with regard to data security practices. Or, the designers may be situated in different geographical locations and subjected to different government laws related to privacy and information sharing. In such cases, designers need to resolve these issues before engaging in co-design. An alternative, legal approach to address this issue is to involve designers in a contract agreement. Such agreements can result in both positive and negative impact on the nature of information sharing and the relationship among partners [20] . Thus, contract agreements may not guarantee collaborators to work in complete harmony and this can impact the nature of solutions emanating from such collaborations.
Encryption
Many types of encryption methods based on content [21, 22, 23] and product features [24, 25, 26] have been proposed to help designers share their information, particularly − 3 − CAD models, with others. These methods enable multiple users to share information at multiple security levels. However, at a given level, the data owner shares the entire information about a particular feature with his/her collaborator. So, this method still runs the risk of information leakage through the collaborator. It is also possible for the collaborator to reverse-engineer confidential information from the shared information. Cryptographic techniques such as fully homomorphic encryption and secure circuit evaluation help in performing multi-party computations securely. Atallah et al. [27] and Pibernik et al. [16] demonstrated the application of these cryptographic techniques in supply-chains. This approach of sharing summary measures is less prone to information leakage. However, these techniques are impractical to implement in scenarios that demand high performance. In design processes, designers typically perform computationally intensive analyses such as Finite Element Analysis, Computational Fluid Dynamics etc. So, these cryptographic techniques are impractical for engineering design.
Research Gaps
Cryptographic approaches such as homomorphic encryption, garbled circuits, etc., achieve the properties of transferring information among collaborators securely. However, they have the following limitations towards their applicability in design:
1. Handling Real Numbers: Cryptography-based approaches are based on modular arithmetic and cannot handle negative numbers. However, the characteristics of physical systems span the entire number line. This implies that the desired computations in a design collaboration should be able to handle real numbers. 2. Security Overhead: The need for security puts a requirement for additional resources and depreciates the computational performance of the product. Reduction in this overhead is necessary as engineering computations are complex. Cryptographic approaches such as homomorphic encryption, garbled circuits, etc. are computationally expensive and are not suited for computationally intensive design and optimization tasks (see further discussion in Section 6).
The Focus of this Paper
The primary contribution in this paper is a secure codesign (SCD) framework that consists of a co-design model, a security model, an adversarial model, and a secure codesign process. This framework enables designers to jointly and securely develop products in a collaborative setting. We implement this framework in three co-design scenarios. In these scenarios, we show how this framework can help designers to overcome fear of misuse of confidential information by collaborators, and information leakage through collusion of collaborators. We also demonstrate that the secure co-design model used in SCD framework is computationally orders of magnitude faster than competing cryptographic techniques.
In the next section, we will discuss the building blocks of the SCD framework.
SAPAS: BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE SECURE CO-DESIGN FRAMEWORK
Wang et al. [28] developed a sequence of data exchanges among designers and a third party server that enables designers to perform their arithmetic and logical operations securely. The sequence of such data exchanges is referred to as SAPAS protocols (Secure Arithmetic and logical oPerations based on Additive Splits). The proposed SCD framework uses SAPAS protocols as the building blocks. SAPAS protocols use Client-Server architecture. They assume that the server is curious, i.e., it can attempt to infer related information from any information received from its clients. In this architecture, designers are referred to as clients and they are modeled to be curious as well. The advantage of SAPAS protocols is that the server learns nothing about inputs and outputs during such transfers.
The data exchanges involved in SAPAS protocols are built on "additive splits", discussed in Section 3.1. We briefly discuss the sequence of the data exchanges in SAPAS protocols in Section 3.2. A detailed discussion on SAPAS protocols can be found in [28] .
Additive Splits
Consider a variable whose value is denoted by v. If v is represented as a sum of m values
then, each v j for j = 1,2...m is referred to as an additive split of v. In SAPAS protocols, collaborative computations are performed on these additive splits (v j ) instead of the original values (v). The owner of a confidential data v would share v 2 ,v 3 ,...,v m additive splits to the rest m − 1 collaborators (see Figure 2) . The knowledge of a split v j does not reveal the original value v. Further, even if the remaining m − 1 collaborators collude, confidential information v is still unknown since v 1 is with the owner of v. In this way, additive splitting helps designers to overcome information leakage.
If the additive splits are of the similar magnitude as v, then it may be possible to infer the order of magnitude of confidential information. Such inference could reveal the nature of computation. Therefore, additive splits should be − 4 − of significantly different orders of magnitude. This can be achieved by adding or multiplying a large random number to obtain the splits. For example, using a large random number, R, a confidential value v can be represented as sum of m(= 2) values :
This can be summarized as the following principle: adding or multiplying the value with a random number hides the value. If the random number is large, it hides the order of magnitude also [29] .
SAPAS protocols make use of additive splitting in the following two interactions:
1. Designer-designer: Designers additively split their confidential inputs and share the m − 1 splits with other designers. These are termed as designer's additive splits. 2. Server-designer: At the end of every computation by the server, it splits the results additively, and distributes them among the m designers. These are termed as server's additive splits.
Cryptographic techniques such as homomorphic encryption [29] use exponentiation for hiding the data. In the proposed approach, we multiply and add random numbers for hiding the data. Adding or multiplying random numbers is orders of magnitude faster than exponentiation. This makes our approach to be computational efficient than the existing cryptographic techniques. This is demonstrated in Section 6.2.
Computations using Additive Splits
The server performs the required computations on the additive splits. However, if all designers send their additive splits to a server, then the server can determine the confidential inputs. To ensure that the server does not learn the confidential inputs of designers from what it receives (or from the computed result), the additive splits are morphed by the designers before sending them to the server. Morphing of additive splits is achieved in a way that it is possible to recreate the morphing by all designers, and removal of morphing is possible on the additive splits received during serverdesigner interactions (i.e, additive splits of computed result).
Let a designer, Alice, be the owner of a variable with value v. Similarly, another designer, Bob, is the owner of confidential information u, Charlie owns w, etc. All of them would like to jointly compute a a function f (u,v,w,...) involving these confidential inputs. During designer-designer interactions, Alice additively splits v and distributes splits v 2 ,...,v m among other designers (one split to each designer). Similarly, all other designers independently split their values and send the splits to other designers. All designers also share a seed S among each other (but not with the server). This seed is used to generate pseudo random numbers. These random numbers are used to morph the additive splits before sending it to the server. The morphing scheme for Alice's input is as follows (see Figure 3 ):
where, r A,1 ,r A,2 are two random numbers chosen by Alice. These random numbers are generated using a shared seed (S) and the selection is informed to all the other collaborators. Recall that v 1 is with Alice. So, the computation in Eq. 4 is performed by Alice. The computation in Eq. 5 is performed by Alice's collaborators. Similarly the additive splits corresponding to u and w are morphed with different random numbers (chosen by Bob and Charlie respectively) generated using the same seed S. The seed S and the selection of these random numbers are not shared with the server. However, the morphed additive splits are sent to the server. This is illustrated in Figure 3 . The server performs the computation as defined by the SAPAS protocols over the morphed splits. Let us denote the result of the computation by t. The server additively splits the result t into {t 1 ,t 2 ,...,t m } and distributes the splits among the designers (see Figure 4) .
The designers perform inverse morphing on these splits, denoted by M −1 (⋅). Inverse morphing involves division of additive split received from the server by a random number used while morphing. For example, the inverse morphing function for Alice's additive splits is given by M −1
Recall that, r A,1 is used for morphing by Alice in Eqns. 4 and 5. This is illustrated in Figure 4 . If the computation performed by server involves inputs from others, their equivalent of r A,1 needs to be divided as well. In other words, if the computation involves inputs from Alice and Bob, then
The resulting data at each designer is the split form of the output of the computation.
− 5 − Here, f (⋅) can be any arithmetic or logical operations including addition, subtraction, division, and multiplication, and higher-order computations that use these basic operations. SAPAS protocols have been designed for secure arithmetic and logical operations such as addition and subtraction (ASP), multiplication (MP), division (DP), exponentiation (EP), and checking whether a quantity is Equivalent-withZero (EW0) or Greater-than-Zero (GT0) [28] . These foundational protocols have been utilized to develop higher level protocols for vector inner product (VIP), checking whether a vector is equal to zero (CVZ), matrix multiplication (MM), checking whether a matrix is full rank (MFRC), and checking a matrix for negative definiteness (MNDC).
In the following section, we describe how a higher level protocol (say vector inner product) can be built using SAPAS protocols.
Illustration of SAPAS protocols: vector inner product (VIP)
Consider a scenario where two designers (m = 2), Alice (A) and Bob (B), have confidential vectors (V and U respectively) of size n. Both want to compute the scalar product ( f (V,U) = V ⋅ U) without revealing their vectors. The process of computing VIP is illustrated in Figure 5 . The pseudo-code for executing this VIP using SAPAS is as follows:
1. Designers share additive splits with each other.
A and B generate random numbers using a shared seed (S). A and B choose and share their selection of random number required for morphing using this seed. The morphing scheme resulting from the selection of random numbers by A is denoted by M A (⋅). Similarly, the morphing scheme resulting from the selection of random numbers by B is denoted by M B (⋅). A and B morph the additive splits corresponding to V using M A (⋅). Similarly, A and B morph the additive splits corresponding to U using M B (⋅) Further, they run the multiplication protocol (MP) for an every element (indexed by i) in their vectors with the help of a server.
3. For each element in the vectors, the server performs MP protocol and determines the computed result
A and B receive an additive split of the product.
(a) The server additively splits the computed result A (⋅)) on their additive splits (t i ) received from the server. Alice and Bob individually sum all these splits received from the server. Let Alice's and Bob's summation be denoted by P A and P B respectively. 5. A and B simultaneously share their P A and P B with each other. The vector inner product can be determined by adding P A and P B . In this way, A and B determine the scalar product f (V,U) = V.U of their confidential inputs.
In the following section, we present our secure codesign framework based on these protocols.
SECURE CO-DESIGN FRAMEWORK
The secure co-design framework consists of a co-design model, a security model, an adversarial model, and a secure co-design process. We describe these in this section.
Co-design Model
The co-design model consists of two or more designers and a third party (if any), where the role of the third party is to merely facilitate the computations. Each designer (represented by D i ) provides a set of inputs (represented by I i ) and learns a set of outputs (represented by O i ) from the codesign model. Similarly, the inputs and outputs that belong to designers other than D i (represented by D −i ) are denoted by I −i and O −i . The relationships that exist between the inputs (I i ⋃I−i) and the outputs (O i ⋃O−i) are mutually agreed − 6 − among designers and could take the form of algebraic expressions, constraints, objective functions, etc. The set of these relationships is represented by R c . This is summarized in Figure 6 . 
Security Model
The set of inputs, I i belong to designer D i and can be partitioned into two subsets: (1) I i,d is the subset of inputs disclosed to other designers (D −i ) and (2) I i,n is the subset of inputs that are not disclosed to anyone. Similarly, the set of outputs that belong to
Designers (D i ,D −i ) do not want to disclose their respective private inputs (I i,n ,I −i,n ) and outputs (O i,n ,O −i,n ) to anyone. If a third party exists, the third party must not learn about any of the designer's inputs (I i ,I −i ) and outputs (O i ,O −i ) through the data exchanges across it. More precisely, designer D i cannot infer about (I −i,n ,O −i,n ) other than what can be inferred from the disclosed information
). These undisclosed inputs and outputs are referred to private quantities in Section 5.
Moreover, designers (D i ,D −i ) should be limited to perform computations defined in mutually agreed R c using their respective set of inputs (I i ,I −i ) to jointly determine their respective set of outputs (O i ,O −i ). In this way, misuse or abuse by designers is prevented. If a third party exists, the third party learns R c .
Adversarial Model
We assume that all the designers are honest-but-curious. They are honest in the sense that they obey the steps involved in exchanging data with other designers. However, they are curious in the sense that a designer (D i ) can attempt to infer about other designer's private inputs and outputs (I −i,n ,O −i,n ). Secure co-design model prevents information leakage from such adversaries.
Similarly, the third party is also assumed to be honestbut-curious i.e., the third party obeys the steps involved in exchanging the data and performs the assigned computations on the shared data. The third party is also assumed not to collude with any designer.
We also assume that the data exchanges between designers and third party use secure channels such as HTTPS. This prevents attacks from entities that are external to the co-design model.
Secure Co-design (SCD) Process
The Secure Co-Design (SCD) process could be constructed using different techniques discussed in Section 2. In this paper, we construct it based on SAPAS protocols [28] discussed in Section 3. For simplicity, we assume that designers do not want to disclose any of their inputs/outputs to others i.e., I i,n = {I i } and O i,n = {O i }. This SCD process comprises of the following eight steps.
1. Share seed for randomness: As described in Section 3.2, designers share a common seed S to generate a series of random numbers among each other. The seed is hidden from the server. In the co-design scenarios considered in this paper, designers bring multiple disciplines together and are interested to find a best-fit solution. According to multi-disciplinary optimization (MDO) literature [30] , these variables can be classified into three categories: state variables, coupling variables, and design variables. State variables belong to designer's internal model. In the co-design model discussed in Section 4.1, these variables belong to non-disclosed inputs (I i,n ,I −i,n ) held by designers (D i ,D −i ). Coupling variables are those variables that are derived from a single or multiple discipline analysis and shared with other designers to influence their design choices. In the co-design model discussed in Section 4.1, the coupling variables are represented by disclosed inputs and outputs (I i,d ,I −i,d ,O i,d ,O −i,d ). Design variables are under the control of an optimizer who performs a single or multiple discipline analysis. The disclosure of these variables depends upon the collaboration structure. In the codesign model discussed in Section 4.1, the design variables belong to outputs (O i ,O −i ). This terminology is followed through the examples discussed in the next section.
Designers can participate in co-design in multiple ways. Some examples are as follows: (1) In this type of co-design scenario, R c constitutes a common objective function, individual objective functions for every designer and constraints. In the following section, we implement the SCD framework for these three co-design scenarios.
IMPLEMENTATION OF SCD FRAME-WORK IN CO-DESIGN SCENARIOS
In this section, we demonstrate the use of SCD framework in three co-design scenarios: (1) Requirements-driven co-design, (2) Objective-driven co-design, and (3) Nash noncooperation. In these design scenarios, based on the nature of information exchanges, there are two possibilities for the solution obtained: (1) Nash Equilibrium: Each designer (D i ) hides their confidential information and makes rational decisions assuming that the other designers (D −i ) make rational decisions. (2) Optimal Solution: Each designer (D i ) reveals their confidential information to all the remaining designers (D −i ). This solution thus achieved is referred as optimal solution and the process is called Full Cooperation. In this paper, we show that the proposed SCD framework enables designers to find optimal solutions in all three scenarios even while hiding confidential information.
We use a problem formulation where Alice and Bob are two designers who are mutually interested in co-design. The design computations involved in this collaboration require information from both designers. It is assumed that Alice and Bob are aware of the mathematical models involved in Fig. 7 : Symmetric truss configuration the design computations. However, they are not aware of the values or the ranges of the inputs/outputs for the computation. These inputs/outputs are confidential in nature and the designers do not want to reveal them to other designers, or to any third party (server).
Requirements-Driven Co-Design
In requirements-driven co-design, a designer provides requirements (specifications) for the other designer to fulfill. Such collaborative relationships exist between an OEM and suppliers, designers and manufacturers, etc. In what follows, we adapt the truss problem from [32] for this scenario.
Example
The configuration of the truss is illustrated in Figure 7 . Two tubular bars are pinned to the ground on one end and pinned with each other on the other end. These members are subjected to a vertical load of 2P and are separated by a base of length B. The average diameter of the tubes is d, and the joint is at a height H. The thickness of the tube is given by t. Density and allowable stress are denoted by γ and σ 0 respectively. The weight of the truss is given by:
The goal is to determine the diameter and the weight of the truss such that (i) the weight (W ) is less than a target weight (W 0 ), and (ii) the truss has a desired factor of safety (s f ) against compressive stresses. The latter constrains the diameter as follows:
Co-design setting Consider this truss design problem within a co-design scenario where the structural designer, Alice, is responsible for satisfying the weight constraint, while the materials designer, Bob, is responsible for satisfying the strength constraint. Alice, being a structural designer, owns the data related to geometry and the forces likely to be experienced at the nodes of the truss. So, Load (P), Height (H), Base (B), target weight (W 0 ), and thickness (t) are Alice's private parameters (or state variables). Satisfying the weight constraint
Bob is a raw material provider (supplier) and he owns private information about the allowable stress (σ 0 ) factor of safety (s f ) and material density (γ). Bob wants to determine the diameter (d, using Eq. 8) of the tubular bars based on his material selection (γ,σ 0 ,s f ). The diameter, in turn, is dependent on Alice's private information. This co-design setting is summarized in Table 1 . 
Implementation of SCD Framework
The SCD framework for the requirements-driven codesign scenario is as follows.
Step 1: Share seed
Alice and Bob share a seed S for generating the random numbers required for morphing and inverse morphing operations.
Step 2: Agree on desired outputs
Alice and Bob agree that Alice would like to learn Weight (W) using Eq. 7, and Bob wants to learn the minimum allowable diameter d using Eq. 8.
Step 3: Identify required computations From Eq. 7, it is clear that W is directly proportional to d and γ. So, Bob would choose a material with the lowest material density and least allowable diameter. The least allowable diameter is given by:
So, the weight of the truss is given by
Alice wants to reduce the weight of the truss below W 0 . She is not aware of Bob's choices (s f ,γ,σ 0 ). So, she chooses H = B in order to reduce the weight. The expressions for W and d are as follows:
Step 4: Execution sequence of SAPAS protocols
We assume that Alice and Bob mutually agree to first compute W , followed by d. This agreement is important for managing the morphing and inverse morphing using the seed (S) shared in Step 1.
Step . They individually split their private quantities (α = α A + α B , β = β A + β B ) using Eqns. 2 and 3. Alice shares α B with Bob and Bob shares β A with Alice. A similar procedure of sharing private quantities that determine d is followed. This is illustrated in Step 5 of Figure 8 .
Step 6: Run SAPAS protocols Alice and Bob need to jointly run the Multiplication Protocol (MP) twice to determine W and d. Let us consider the computation of W first. At the end of Step 5, Alice and Bob have two additive splits each. These splits require morphing before execution of the SAPAS protocol. Morphing requires random numbers (refer to Eqns. 4 and 5). These are generated using the seed (S). Let these random numbers be r 1 ,r 2 ,r 3 ... and so on. Assume that, (r 1 ,r 2 ) and (r 3 ,r 4 ) are used to morph (α A ,α B ) and (β A ,β B ) respectively. Let these morphing schemes be denoted as M A (⋅) and M B (⋅), respectively. After morphing, Alice and Bob jointly run the SAPAS protocol using an external server. After the computation at the server ends, Alice receives t A from server. She determines W A = M −1 (t A ) = Table 2 . A similar process is followed to determine the diameter (d). Step 7: Share additive splits of outputs Alice and Bob exchange d A and W B respectively with each other.
Step 8: Determine desired outputs 
Comparison with Full Cooperation
In This example is chosen to demonstrate how SAPAS protocols can be used in co-design problems. In this specific problem, after determining d, Bob would be able to infer Alice's private quantity ( √ 2P πt ). This leak is attributed to the nature of the problem. In the following examples, such leakages are not possible.
Objective-driven co-design
In objective-driven collaboration, all designers share a common global objective. Each designer may have internal constraints related to their specific part of the design, such as manufacturing capabilities. We illustrate such a scenario using the design a helical spring. This design problem is adapted from [33] .
Consider a spring made up of a material with shear modulus G, mass density ρ, and maximum permissible shear stress τ max . The wire diameter is denoted by d and the coil diameter is denoted by D. The spring also has inactive turns denoted by Q. The spring is subjected to a load P and the resulting deflection is denoted by δ. The weight of such a spring can be determined by:
where,
Constraints could arise while designing such a spring. For example, avoiding the failure of the spring due to load P can be a constraint. The spring can fail due to buckling, fatigue, or yielding. The failure constraints can be represented as:
Here, s f denotes factor of safety and a,b are determined based on the nature of failure. The problem of designing a spring can be modeled as an optimization problem with the objective of minimizing weight, subject to the failure constraints.
Co-design setting:
Similar to the previous example, we assume Alice to be a structural designer. She has control over the geometry and the forces experienced by the spring. So, Alice's private quantities or design variables are load (P), number of inactive turns (Q) and deflection (δ). Bob is a materials designer who has control over material properties including the Shear Modulus (G), mass density (ρ), and maximum permissible value of shear stress (τ max ). These are Bob's design variables. Bob has an additional responsibility of avoiding the failure of spring. So, the values of a,b,s f are also chosen by Bob and they are his state variables. This problem formulation is summarized in Table 3 .
Implementation of SCD framework
The SCD framework for objective-driven scenario is similar to what was discussed in Section 5.1.1. Alice and Bob share a seed S for generating random numbers required for morphing and inverse morphing operations.
Step 2: Agree on desired outputs Alice wants to determine her state variable, the coil diameter (D), and Bob wants to determine his state variable, the wire diameter (d). Both of them are interested in knowing the weight (W ).
Step 3: Identify required computations
There are numerous ways to solve the optimization problem. We solve this problem using techniques from geometric programming. We chose this approach to derive the analytical expressions for (W,D,d). In order to obtain analytical expressions, we convert the primal into its associated dual. For brevity, the details of this conversion are not included in this paper. The details for this conversion are available in [34] . The normality and orthogonal conditions of the dual problem are given as follows,
On solving the above equations, we get,
. Further, we derive the expressions for (W,D,d) in terms of the private quantities and δ 1 .
Step 4: Execution sequence of SAPAS protocols Unlike the previous example, the computations to determine (W,D,d) involve a combination of arithmetic operations such as multiplication, exponentiation and division. Determining W requires computing k 1 ,k 2 ,k 3 first. Later, exponentiation of k 1 ,k 2 ,k 3 with different functions of δ 1 gives W . k 1 ,k 3 involve division, whereas, k 2 involves multiplication of Alice and Bob's private quantities. We use the following notation k 1 → DP to represent that SAPAS protocol, DP, is used to determine the additive splits corresponding to k 1 . These splits along with the splits of δ 1 are used ro run the SAPAS protocol, DP, again. At the end of this computation, Alice and Bob have the additive splits corresponding to
The sequence of all the SAPAS protocols to determine W is given below:
The sequence above is one of many other possible sequences for determining W . Designers may choose to agree on any one of them. A similar agreement on the sequence is needed for computing D and d as well.
Step 5: Share additive splits of inputs
The values of the private quantities owned by Alice are as follows: P = 510N, δ = 0.02m, Q = 2. And Bob's private quantities are as follows: τ max = 0.306 * 10 9 N m 2 , ρ = 78 * 10 3 N m 3 , a = 0.75, b = 2.75, s f = 1 and G = 8.56 * 10 10 N m 2 . They additively split all their inputs and share a split with their collaborator.
Step 6: Run SAPAS protocols Now, Alice and Bob have all the required additive splits. They need to morph these splits before the execution of the SAPAS protocols. They use the shared seed S to generate the random numbers required for morphing. After morphing, Alice and Bob jointly execute the SAPAS protocols in the sequence that they mutually agreed upon in Step 3. After executing all the SAPAS protocols, Alice and Bob receive splits corresponding to W,D,d from server. Alice and Bob independently perform inverse morphing on these splits and determine (W A ,D A ,d A ) and (W B ,D B ,d B ) , respectively. The values of these splits are listed in Table 4 .
Step 7: Share additive splits of outputs 
Comparison with Full Cooperation
In 
Nash Non-Cooperation Scenario
The designers in the problems above are assumed to share a common objective. However, in many design scenarios, different designers may have their own objectives. Such scenarios can be modeled as Nash Non-Cooperation scenarios [35] . For solving such co-design problems, the following method is commonly practiced. Designers formulate their rational reaction sets (RRS) or best response correspondence (BRC). The solution in such cases is the Nash equilibrium, which is the point of intersection of such RRSs from different designers. Optimal solutions can be obtained when designers openly share their confidential information with each other. In general, such solutions are better than the Nash Equilibrium. In this section, we show that it is possible for designers to arrive at such optimal solutions without revealing the values of their private quantities and objectives in a Nash Non-Cooperation scenario.
Further, in the two examples discussed above, it was assumed that the designers could arrive at closed form analytical expressions for their desired outputs. This may not be the case in all design scenarios. In such cases, iterative approaches are needed to determine solutions. Moreover, unlike analytical expressions, these approaches may involve both arithmetic and logical operations. We consider such a scenario and show how to construct iterative methods within the SCD framework. Specifically, we implement the Newton Raphson method (NRM) [36] based on the SCD framework.
Example
Assume two designers, Alice and Bob, would like to collaborate with each other on a system design problem. Assume that Alice has control over her design variable x, and Bob has control over his design variable y. Their individual objectives are to minimize the mass of the individual sub-systems they are designing. We represent the mass of the subsystem designed by Alice as the function f a . Similarly, the mass of Bob's sub-system is denoted by f b . Let the overall mass of the system be denoted by g( f a , f b ) = f a + f b . The overall system is coupled. Therefore, the individual subsystem masses are functions of both the design variables, i.e., f a ∶= f a (x,y) and f b ∶= f b (x,y). A specific numerical example is listed in Table 5 . For illustrative purposes, the values of (α,β,r 1 ) in Alice's function ( f a ) is chosen to be (4, 4, 2) and the values of (γ,δ,r 2 ) in Bob's function( f b ) are chosen to be (8,1,3 ).
Full Cooperation
In Full Cooperation co-design scenario, Alice and Bob share the mass functions ( f a , f b ) with each other. With this, either designer can use numerical methods such as Newton Raphson's Method and determine the roots. This is a well known method for solving multiple equations simultaneously and this process, in case of two variables, is repeated as per Eq. 24.
where (x 0 ,y 0 ) are their initial values. The (x,y) values thus obtained at the end of each iteration are listed in Table 6 . The stopping criterion for this iterative process is as follows: the relative change in both of the design variables (x,y) has to be less than or equal to 0.001. The stopping criterion is met in the 10 th iteration. The corresponding values of (g( f a , f b ),x,y) are (0.000, 5.597, 2.796) respectively.
Confidentiality Preservation
Now consider a scenario where the functional forms of g, f a , f b is common knowledge, but Alice and Bob are reluctant to share their private quantities (Alice:α,β,r 1 , Bob: γ,δ,r 2 ). One way to hide these private quantities from each other is to exchange rational reaction sets (RRSs) instead of the private quantities. The intersection of the RRSs is the Nash equilibrium. In this numerical problem listed in Table 5, Alice's RRS is x = 4, and Bob's RRS is y = 1. In other words, Alice and Bob would not reveal any values of their private quantities and hence reach a Nash Equilibrium which is (x = 4,y = 1). The corresponding value of the global objective is g( f a , f b ) = 12.
Clearly, this is an inferior solution compared to the one obtained using Full Cooperation. For a better illustration, the Nash Equilibrium and Pareto Optimal solutions are shown in Figure 9 . Additionally, sharing RRSs may inadvertently reveal additional information about the private quantities. For example, Alice's RRS reveals the value of her α.
From information exchange point of view, Nash noncooperation and Full Cooperation reflect two extreme ends for a collaboration. This shows that the designer has to make a choice between the following two options: (i) reveal private quantities and achieve optimal solutions, or (ii) do not reveal the private quantities and achieve sub-optimal solutions. With the SCD framework, it is possible to achieve both at the same time. Designers can achieve optimal solutions without revealing their private quantities to anyone. In Table 5 : Nash non-cooperation: problem formulation
Design Variable x y Private Quantities α,β,r 1 γ,δ,r 2 
Implementation of SCD framework
In this section, we implement Secure Co-design framework to the NRM in a Nash non-cooperation scenario.
Alice and Bob share a seed S for generating random numbers.
Step 2: Agree on desired outputs Alice and Bob agree on the formulation in Table 5 .
In this problem, it is possible to derive the analytical expressions for the design variables (x,y) and use SAPAS protocols to solve them. However, the intention in this section is to demonstrate how SAPAS protocols can be used to perform higher level-computations such as matrix inverse and optimization.
Alice and Bob agree to perform all the arithmetic and logical operations in Eq. 24 using SAPAS protocols. As in any iterative method, designers need to come to a consensus on the stopping criterion while using SCD framework. This could be the number of iterations, residual/increments etc. Alice and Bob agree on the same convergence criterion used in Section 5.3.1.
Eq. 24 involves a matrix inverse operation. Alice and Bob need to agree on a method to compute the matrix inverse. Let us assume they agree upon the Guass-Jordan method.
Step 4: Execution sequence of SAPAS protocols Eq. 24 involves several computations such as matrix inverse, matrix-vector product etc. The sequence in which these computations are executed is mutually agreed between Alice and Bob.
In the first iteration, while using the NRM, Alice and Bob would start with their RRSs, i.e., x = 4 and y = 1, respectively. They additively split their RRSs and share one of the splits with their collaborator. So, Alice shares −7.665 with Bob and Bob shares 10.165 with Alice. Unlike sharing of RRS, this sharing fails to reveal anyone's private quantity.
Step 6: Run SAPAS protocols Now, Alice and Bob have all the required additive splits. They need to morph these splits before the execution of SAPAS protocols. They use the shared seed S to generate the random numbers required for morphing. After morphing, Alice and Bob jointly execute the SAPAS protocols in the sequence that they mutually agreed upon in Step 3.
The computation for determining whether the convergence criterion is met can be performed at the end of every iteration. Based on this result, the decision on whether to proceed or stop can also be made. This form of branching can be constructed within the SCD framework (using GT0 protocol). The main advantage of incorporating this computation within the SCD framework is that designers have control on when to reveal the value of the residual/increment. In Full − 13 − Cooperation, every designer can determine the residual at the end of every iteration. This approach can be used to reveal the residual after each iteration. The drawback is that this repeated calculation may provide unintended insights to collaborators. Also, if we share the splits at the end of every iteration, the number of communication rounds increases. And this would have a significant effect on network delay [28] . This situation does not arise if designers share their splits related to the residual after the stopping criterion is met. In this way, the effect of network delay can be reduced.
After executing all the SAPAS protocols, Alice and Bob receive additive splits from the server. They independently perform inverse morphing on these splits and determine (x A ,y A ) and (x B ,y B ), respectively. The values of these splits are listed in Table 7 . For illustrative purposes, we list the values of (x,y) for every iteration. However, neither Alice nor Bob can learn these values since they do not have the corresponding x B and y A . These are shared only when the stopping criterion is met.
Step 7: Share additive splits of outputs
The stopping criterion is met in iteration #10. At the end of this iteration, Alice and Bob exchange y A and x B , respectively.
Step 8: Determine desired outputs Alice and Bob determine the values of x(= x A + x B = 5.597) and y(= y A + y B = 2.796), respectively at the end of iteration #10. Note that these x and y values result in both the global objective g( f a , f b ) and respective internal objectives ( f a , f b ) to be 0.000.
In the three examples discussed in this section, we have shown how the SCD framework can be implemented in scenarios where designers can perform their design computations either using analytical expressions or using an iterative process. The SCD framework does not impose any form of optimization techniques on the designers. In these examples, we used geometric programming and Newton Raphson Method (NRM) for illustrative purposes only. Designers can choose any optimization algorithm for their co-design problem. The requirements for using the SCD framework are as follows: (i) designers need to mutually agree on a particular algorithm, and (ii) all the computations involved in the algorithm need to be performed using SAPAS based protocols.
With these examples, we conclude that the SCD framework enables designers to achieve the same or better solutions as obtained while openly sharing in different co-design scenarios. In this way, the SCD framework maintains the confidentiality of information throughout the process.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the advantages and limitations of the proposed SCD framework. We also demonstrate that SCD framework is computational lightweight making it more practical for iterative design scenarios.
Advantages
The SCD framework provides designers with three main advantages (1) Avoid misuse of confidential information by collaborator(s) (2) Prevent information leakage through collusion among collaborator(s) (3) Computationally efficient than competing cryptogrpahic approaches. The first two advantages are discussed in this section using the example discussed in Section 5.1. Section 6.2 highlights the computational performance of the SCD framework.
In the example discussed in Section 5.1, the mutually agreed computation is multiplication (say W = 4γ σ 0 * PB). Since this computation is executed by the server, Alice is restricted to perform only multiplication with Bob's additive split (corresponding to 4γ σ 0 ). Similar restriction applies while
). In this way, SCD framework restricts designers to determine only the outcome of a mutually agreed computation. This avoids any misuse of designer's private quantities within a collaboration.
In this example, Alice cannot determine the actual values of (
Similarly Bob also cannot determine (W,d). Since the output of a computation (say W ) is in the form of additive splits (W A ,W B ), it requires every collaborator (Bob, owner of W B ) to share their corresponding additive split (W B ) to determine the outcome of a computation (W ). Thus, the SCD framework restricts information leakage through collusion. Note that Alice can determine the product of PB after learning W . To avoid such leakage on W , Alice and Bob can perform the computation W ≥ W 0 within SCD framework and determine the binary output.
We believe that these advantages will enable designers to overcome their fear of loosing their confidential information to other collaborators during collaboration. We also think that such framework might open up new forms of design collaborations.
Computational performance of SCD
In this section, we demonstrate the computational advantage of SCD with competing state-of-the-art methods such as homomorphic encryption. We also compare the time taken by SCD framework with a collaboration where designers openly share their confidential information i.e, Full Cooperation.
Experimental setup
The time taken is determined by conducting experiments on a single laptop. Server and clients are simulated using different terminals. Relevant codes for both Server and Client are written in Python. These codes are run on different terminals, under nominal load of a computer. A UNIX based command "time python" is used to determine the time taken for execution. Section 6.2.2 discusses the comparison between two co-design scenarios: SCD framework vs. Full Cooperation (designers reveal the values for their private information).
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SCD versus Full Cooperation
Recall that during Full Cooperation, designers openly share information with each other. So, information sharing happens between Alice and Bob. On the other hand, SCD is based on SAPAS protocols which involve both clients (Alice and Bob) and a server. So, it is expected that the SCD framework would take more computation time than Full Cooperation. In other words, this section demonstrates the computational overhead to protect the designer's confidential information.
In simulations, Alice initiates the collaboration with Bob. So, the time taken by Alice is more than Bob. Table  8 displays the measured elapsed time by Alice using the earlier mentioned experimental setup. From Table 8 it is clear that the time taken by SCD is close to double the time taken in Full Cooperation. This can be mainly attributed to the inclusion of the server.
Please note that the experimental setup constructed is a very crude approach for measuring the exact time for execution. Much finer methods can demonstrate the exact advantages of SCD Framework. Also, the time taken can be optimized further but this is out of the scope of this paper. 
SCD versus Homomorphic Encryption
In this section, we compare our computation technique (SCD) with computation schemes over encrypted data. Paillier cryptosystem [37] is a very well accepted encryption scheme which enables computation over encrypted data. The keysize used for encryption is 128 bit long.
In Example 1, determining W and d involves multiplication of confidential information from Alice and Bob. These multiplications are computed using Paillier and SCD. The computation time is determined in the same manner as mentioned in Section 6.2. The observed values are listed in Table 9 . Note that even to get a 3 decimal accuracy (d in cm) for multiplication, Paillier cryptosystem takes almost double the time as SCD. This difference compounds as the computations become more complex. With this, we conclude that SCD is well suited for performing secure computations in engineering collaborations. 
Limitations
There are certain limitations to the proposed framework. These are listed as follows:
1. In the current framework, collaborators are assumed to be curious. The framework does not account for malicious collaborators i.e, collaborators manipulate the information shared. This can be addressed by deploying integrity verification methods. We shall pursue such techniques in our future work. 2. Designers need to mutually agree on the computations involved. This approach may not be suited for creative design applications. 3. In the proposed approach, while running design iterations, no designer has actual control over the iterations.
There is a possibility of giving additional control to one of the designers using asymmetry protocols but this can happen only at the cost of additional computations.
CLOSING COMMENTS
Collaborative design platforms, such as Product Lifecycle Management (PLM), have received attention from both industry and academia in the recent past. These platforms enable designers to exchange information with each other. The exchanged information is used to perform a design computation. However, if the information is confidential in nature, the designers face a challenge. They need to perform the computations involved securely. A popular approach is to perform computations over encrypted data (say homomorphic encryption). Such approaches are time consuming, which makes them impractical in iterative design processes.
In this paper, we take a first modest step towards addressing this research gap by answering the following research question: How can confidentiality of design information be preserved while simultaneously achieving optimal solutions in a practical co-design setting? We present a framework, Secure co-design (SCD), based on the protocols developed by Wang et al. [28] . This framework helps designers to perform their computations without revealing their confidential information with each other. This framework is applied in three different co-design scenarios: (1) requirements-driven co-design, (2) objective-driven codesign, and (3) Nash non-cooperation. In all these scenarios, it is shown that SCD enables designers to perform design computations securely and achieve solutions same as those obtained through Full Cooperation.
The SCD framework prevents any misuse of confidential information and leakage through collusion. More importantly, SCD is computationally lightweight. Hence, the proposed SCD framework is a practical approach for maintaining confidentiality of information throughout the co-design process. We believe that the SCD framework can be used in other engineering fields, such as simulation and manufacturing as well. We plan to extend the use of these secure protocols to MDO architectures [30] as well.
The focus of this paper is to lay the foundation of a framework that enables designers to compute without revealing their inputs. We believe that there is scope for improvement in SCD framework by addressing research questions (but not limited to), such as: (1) What is the trade-off between confidentiality and efficiency (in terms of computational speed) of the SCD framework? and (2) How to choose a solution when there are multiple optimal solutions in the SCD framework? In future, we envision that this framework could be extended to a layered architecture with increasing levels of abstraction. Such a layered architecture could help designers to modify the framework suiting to their co-design scenario.
